Bangladesh Army Founds The Army Hill & Jungle Warfare School

On 18 April 2026, the Chief of Army Staff of Bangladesh, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, visited Alikadam Cantonment in Bandarban and formally inaugurated the newly built Army Hill and Jungle Warfare School. This specialized training institution is designed to enhance the Bangladesh Army’s operational capacity in conducting missions in remote hilly and forested areas, as well as in plains. By offering focused training on physical fitness, mental resilience, and tactical skills, the institution aims to prepare troops for high-risk operations in rugged, jungle terrain. Senior officers, including the GOC of Army Training & Doctrine Command, the engineer-in-chief, the adjutant general, and the GOC of the 24th Infantry Division, attended the inauguration, underscoring its importance.

A warfare school is generally a military training center dedicated to a specific environment or type of combat. Rather than general combat training, such schools teach tactics, survival skills, and equipment use tailored to one setting, for example, jungle, mountain, desert, or arctic conditions. Globally, armies often maintain specialized schools, for instance, jungle warfare schools, mountain warfare schools, or counter-insurgency schools, to train units for those environments. For example, India’s Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) in Mizoram trains troops for guerrilla and jungle fighting, while the US Marine Corps operates a Jungle Warfare Training Center at Camp Gonsalves, Okinawa. These institutions combine classroom instruction, live exercises, and acclimatization to harsh terrain so that soldiers can survive in the jungle and operate effectively to complete objectives.

Chief of Army Staff General Waker-Uz-Zaman inaugurating the Army Hill and Jungle Warfare School at Alikadam Cantonment in Bandarban. Source: ISPR Bangladesh. 

Prior to 2026, the Bangladesh Army lacked a dedicated jungle-warfare school. Jungle and hill training were instead integrated into broader infantry and commando programs. These programs were concentrated in the School of Infantry and Tactics (SI&T), now in Sylhet. Established on 19 March 1973 at Comilla Cantonment as the School of Infantry, it evolved rapidly, adding a tactical wing in 1974 and relocating to Jessore Cantonment. Finally, it moved to Jalalabad Cantonment in Sylhet in 1979. In 1982, the separately organized Special Warfare School was merged into SI&T as the Special Warfare Wing, which has since conducted special forces and counter-insurgency training, though not exclusively focused on jungle terrain.

Other facilities include the Army Airborne School at Jalalabad for parachute infantry training and various combined-arms schools for armor, artillery, and engineers. The Navy’s Special Warfare Diving and Salvage (SWADS), based in Rangamati, trains naval commandos with some jungle elements alongside diving and maritime operations. By contrast, the new Army Hill & Jungle Warfare School at Alikadam is solely devoted to operations in hilly and jungle terrain. According to ISPR press releases and media reports, it offers specialized training to develop the endurance, resilience, and tactics needed in dense forests and rugged hills. The Bangladesh Army emphasizes that this will strengthen the force’s overall combat readiness for adverse conditions. In practice, this school will likely teach jungle patrol, ambush and survival skills, mountain navigation, and possibly construction of field defenses in forest environs. As a permanent facility, it centralizes expertise that in the past may have been improvised.

This is the first formal institution of its kind in Bangladesh, even though the country’s own  geography in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, has long required jungle training.

Local context

The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT), comprising the districts of Rangamati, Khagrachhari, and Bandarban, represents one of the most complex and sensitive security environments in The roots of the conflict date back to the early years following independence, when, in 1972, members of various ethnic groups such as Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and others, formed the Parbatya Chattagram Jana Samhati Samiti (PCJSSS or JSS for short) to demand regional autonomy, recognition of indigenous identity, and preservation of land rights. 

Its armed wing, Shanti Bahini, launched a guerrilla insurgency against the state beginning in 1975, leading to a prolonged conflict lasting over two decades (1975–1997) that was characterized by ambushes, counter-insurgency operations, forced displacement, and widespread human suffering, with tens of thousands of locals displaced internally or fleeing across the border into India. The situation was further aggravated by state-sponsored settlement programs between 1979 and 1984, during which large numbers of Bengali settlers were relocated to the region.

The conflict formally ended with the signing of the Chittagong Hill Tracts Peace Accord on 2 December 1997, which promised regional autonomy through local governance bodies, withdrawal of temporary military camps, resolution of land disputes, and rehabilitation of refugees and internally displaced persons. Following the agreement, Shanti Bahini fighters disarmed, and many refugees returned from India. However, implementation has been partial and inconsistent, amounting to nearly two-thirds of the accord’s provisions remaining unimplemented even after almost three decades due to reaching impasses, particularly those concerning land rights, demilitarization, and political autonomy, allowing underlying grievances to persist. Despite the formal end of insurgency, the CHT remains volatile, with periodic outbreaks of violence, communal tensions, and human rights concerns.

The inauguration of the Army Hill & Jungle Warfare School in Bandarban marks a major step in strengthening Bangladesh’s military training framework. It reflects an understanding that future operations will increasingly take place in complex terrains such as hills, forests, and border regions like the Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT).

More broadly, the school aligns Bangladesh with a global shift toward specialized training for non-conventional battlefields. On top of this, warfare in neighboring Myanmar remains a constant spectre. Over time, it could develop into a platform for multinational cooperation through joint exercises and training exchanges, strengthening both technical capacity and diplomatic ties.  

Joining an experienced bunch

While the step is momentous, Bangladesh joins a region already populated by armed forces trained in and experienced in jungle warfare. The Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS) of the Indian Army is located in Vairengte and is a premier training and research institution specializing in counter-insurgency, jungle warfare, and guerrilla tactics.

 Established in 1967 as the Jungle Training School and later relocated and upgraded in 1970, it developed into a Category A training establishment with a focus on unconventional warfare. Its motto, “Fight the guerrilla like a guerrilla,” reflects its doctrine of adaptive, small-unit operations in difficult terrain. The school trains Indian Army personnel, paramilitary forces, police, and international militaries from countries including the United States, United Kingdom, France, Israel, and others. Training includes jungle survival, ambush tactics, IED detection, intelligence gathering, reflex firing, and counter-terrorism operations, conducted through rigorous field exercises and simulations in dense jungle environments.

CIJWS gained operational relevance during regional conflicts such as the Bangladesh Liberation War, which temporarily shaped its training focus. Over time, it has evolved into a globally recognized center of excellence, influencing the establishment of similar institutions such as the Kaziranga Special Jungle Warfare Training School which is also located in India. CJWS continues to emphasize practical, small-unit tactics, survivability, and minimizing collateral damage in modern low-intensity conflict scenarios.

The Tatmadaw of Myanmar has experience in jungle warfare through decades of fighting insurgents in its border areas. While little is publicized about formal schools, it is understood that due to the prevalence of insurgencies and the Myanmar Civil War most recently, specialization in jungle warfare is integrated into regular military training. Officer cadets for all three branches of the Tatmadaw are trained at its Defense Services Academy in the town of Pyin Oo Lwin in Mandalay Region. Myanmar’s foreign assistance trainers have reportedly helped upgrade training, augmenting home-grown knowledge. However, no official “Jungle Warfare School” is known; training is likely integrated into overall infantry instruction.

The People’s Liberation Army of China does not publicly advertise a jungle school but has heavily emphasized high-altitude and cold-weather training. In recent years under Xi Jinping, the Western Theatre Command bordering India in Tibet and Xinjiang have built extensive high-altitude training programs. Chinese soldiers practice shoveling snow and living in frigid conditions as routine exercises. The PLA’s focus is on mountain warfare and “informatized” forces, for example, building concealed bases above 4000 m to train in hypoxic cold. While the PLA does organize jungle exercises, especially in southern tropical areas, no standalone jungle school is well-known. The PLA does have institutional experience in jungle warfare gained from the Sino-Vietnamese War. Many PLA veterans of that conflict remain living. General Zhang Youxia, recently purged from the Central Military Commission of the PLA, was one of those veterans.

During the Vietnam War, the Jungle Warfare Training Centre at Nui Dat trained the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) and local militia under the guidance of the Australian Army Training Team Vietnam to conduct counterinsurgency operations against the Viet Cong and the People's Army of Vietnam. Despite such efforts, the war ultimately ended in 1975 with the victory of North Vietnam, followed by national reunification in 1976. The Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces demonstrated exceptional mastery of jungle warfare through asymmetric tactics, including hit-and-run ambushes, extensive use of booby traps such as punji stakes and improvised explosive devices, and the construction of vast tunnel networks. These networks, such as in Cu Chi, functioned as underground operational bases. Their strategy of close-quarters engagement, often described as “hugging the enemy," neutralized the technological advantages of U.S. firepower, while deep familiarity with terrain and support from local populations enabled sustained guerrilla operations along routes such as the Ho Chi Minh Trail.

In the post-war era, these experiences were absorbed into the doctrine of the unified Vietnamese military, where jungle warfare remains an embedded core capability rather than a specialized institutional discipline. Elite units such as the Dac Cong continue to refine these skills, specializing in unconventional warfare, infiltration, and sabotage, reflecting a system where jungle combat expertise is integrated across the force rather than confined to a dedicated school. The Vietnam People's Armed Forces stand as one of the most experienced forces in jungle warfare in modern history.

Similarly, the Philippine Army possesses a long-standing tradition of jungle warfare rooted in its experience during World War II, when Filipino soldiers and guerrilla fighters resisted the Imperial Japanese Army through ambushes, sabotage, and intelligence operations in dense forests and mountainous terrain. This legacy has evolved into modern operational expertise through decades of counter-insurgency campaigns against groups such as the New People's Army and Islamist militant organizations in Mindanao, including the Abu Sayyaf Group, Moro Islamic Liberation Front, Moro National Liberation Front, and the Maute Group. Rather than maintaining a single dedicated jungle warfare school, training is institutionalized within elite units such as the Special Forces Regiment (Airborne) and the Scout Rangers, with key instruction conducted at facilities like Fort Magsaysay.

Supported by long-standing cooperation with the United States Armed Forces through joint exercises such as Balikatan, the Philippine model, similar to Vietnam’s, relies on continuous, experience-driven jungle warfare training embedded across the force rather than a standalone specialized institution.