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The Arakan Army's Emerging Governance Structures
- Afiya Ibnath Ayshi
- 6 hours ago
- 13 min read
The Arakan Army (AA) is an armed group in Myanmar that was founded in April 2009 by Twan Mrat Naing and around twenty-five fighters along the Myanmar–China border, with support from the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). Over the past decade, the AA has grown into one of the most effective ethnic armed groups in Myanmar. Following the launch of Operation 1027, an October 2023 offensive by a coalition of ethnic armed groups that weakened military control across parts of Myanmar, the group has entered a new phase. It now controls 14 of 17 townships in Rakhine State, as well as Paletwa Township in Chin State.
Across much of Rakhine, the AA and its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), have begun to operate as a governing authority. Through the Arakan People's Revolutionary Government (APRG), they have established administrative systems such as tax collection offices, courts, police, schools, hospitals, and even a lottery system. This indicates that the group is not only engaged in military activity but is also aiming to create an “Arakan Nation” through the “Way of Rakhita,” an ideology focused on national liberation and self-rule for the Arakanese people, often described by its leaders as the “Arakan Dream.”
While the AA has not formally declared independence, its activities increasingly resemble those of a proto state. The organization is gradually replacing Myanmar’s administrative structures with its own institutions, creating an alternative system of governance that operates largely independently of Naypyidaw.
The Shift from Insurgent Force to De Facto State Authority
Control of territory has long been central to insurgent survival but governing that territory poses a more complex challenge. The decisive shift occurs when armed movements’ focus move beyond battlefield success, and they begin building institutions that can sustain political authority. The Arakan Army is going through this transition. Long-term authority depends not only on military strength, but also on the ability to administer daily life. Functions such as taxation, dispute resolution, education, healthcare, and public order are central to establishing a durable system of governance. Increasingly, the AA is attempting to provide these functions in areas under its control.
The AA's rise has been gradual rather than sudden. For its first half-decade, the AA remained a relatively small group among Myanmar's ethnic armed organizations. Excluded from the 2015 Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement and operating in competition against the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), it initially struggled for recognition and influence. As of mid-2014 the group had only around 1,500 fighters, then rising to more than 2,500 a year later. Political developments in Rakhine, however, created an environment that worked to the AA's advantage. Following the 2015 election, many Rakhine voters were frustrated when the National League for Democracy (NLD) appointed its own chief minister despite the electoral success of the Arakan National Party. It deepened local resentment that the AA was able to convert into recruits.
Over the following years, the group steadily strengthened its position. Initial sporadic clashes escalated into sustained conflict from 2018 onward. An informal ceasefire reached with the Tatmadaw in November 2020 offered a temporary pause in hostilities, but rather than scaling back its activities, the AA used the period to consolidate its organization, expand local networks, and deepen its administrative presence. Fighting resumed in 2022 and escalated dramatically after the launch of Operation 1027 in late 2023, when the AA joined forces with the Three Brotherhood Alliance in a coordinated offensive against the military regime.
By March 2025, the AA had established control over 14 of Rakhine State's 17 townships, and more than 90% of the state's territory. Its capture of the Western Regional Command headquarters in Ann Township further weakened the military's position and gave the AA effective control over Myanmar's entire 271-kilometer border with Bangladesh. The organization then also consolidated its authority in Paletwa Township in neighboring Chin State, a strategically important area that connects Rakhine with India's northeast.
Despite these territorial gains, the AA has not framed its objective as outright independence. Instead, its leadership has repeatedly spoken of achieving a confederate arrangement within Myanmar, similar to the autonomy long maintained by the United Wa State Army. This position suggests that its strategy is not only territorial expansion but also political consolidation within an altered state structure.
Comparative cases highlight the significance of this transition. The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka ran this kind of proto-state, controlling the Vanni region of the north for roughly two decades with Kilinochchi serving as a de facto capital complete with its own police force, courts, a bank & even a television station. Within the areas it controlled, the LTTE performed state functions including a civil police force, human rights organizations, a coordination office for humanitarian assistance, health and education boards, a bank, a radio station and a television station. The LTTE relied heavily on a hybrid arrangement in which government-paid teachers & medical staff kept working for the rebel administration and kept their state salaries. The LTTE’s strength relied heavily on coercion, including forced taxation, compulsory recruitment, and punitive measures against dissenters. Yet, this arrangement collapsed rapidly within weeks once the Sri Lankan military took Kilinochchi & Mullaitivu in early 2009.
On the other side of the continent, from 2005 until capturing Kabul in August 2021, the Taliban gradually expanded territorial control while simultaneously establishing a shadow government. This involved installing provincial and district shadow cabinets headed by shadow governors and building major components including finance, health, education, judicial, culture, media and taxation commissions well before the actual military takeover. These systems allowed both movements to exercise authority beyond the battlefield and gain a degree of legitimacy among local populations.
Arakan People's Revolutionary Government
The AA's governance project’s roots can be traced to the establishment of the Arakan People's Authority in 2019, a local administrative mechanism created to manage rural administration, where the Myanmar government had little effective presence. As the AA's territorial control expanded, however, the scope of these institutions grew accordingly and has since evolved into the Arakan People's Revolutionary Government (APRG). Reportedly, governance now runs through a layered structure extending from village and village-tract committees to higher authorities. Civilian departments oversee most aspects of governance, while law enforcement and public security functions are coordinated through separate institutions. Military responsibilities remain under the AA itself, creating a distinction between civilian administration and armed operations that resembles the division of responsibilities found in conventional state systems.
The APRG today operates more than ten distinct government departments covering administration, judiciary, health, education, transportation, taxation & customs, municipal affairs, fire services, forestry & natural resources, agriculture & livestock, corrections, & technology & communications. To support this expanding bureaucracy, the administration has also invested in training future civil servants. The establishment of the Arakan School of Public Policy and Administration reflects an attempt to develop a professional cadre of administrators capable of managing increasingly complex governance responsibilities. According to reports, courses are taught by local specialists as well as academics and practitioners from other parts of Myanmar and abroad, indicating an effort to move beyond military leadership and create technical expertise within the emerging administration.
Territorial administration has also been reorganized. The AA has replaced the old military-zone system with an eight-district civilian structure encompassing Sittwe, Maungdaw, Mrauk-U, Minbya, Thandwe, Kyaukphyu, Taungup, and Paletwa, a reform meant to make service delivery, in healthcare, education, transport & judicial administration, more systematic rather than improvised. At the village level, the AA has set up Village Administration Committees, typically composed of around ten members. These committees serve as the primary interface between residents and the broader administrative system, reporting through successive layers of authority to higher levels of governance.
The composition of these committees differs by community. In many ethnic Rakhine communities, committee membership includes former village administrators and educated local residents. In Rohingya-majority areas, the structure appears more flexible, incorporating religious leaders, community elders, and other locally influential figures where appropriate. This adaptability reflects the practical challenges of governing diverse communities across a conflict-affected region.
One of the most distinctive aspects of the AA's governance model is its willingness to incorporate rather than entirely replace existing state institutions. In several areas, teachers, healthcare workers, and other civil servants originally appointed by the State Administration Council (SAC) have continued performing their duties under AA supervision. Although these employees remain formally on Tatmadaw’s payroll, reports indicate that many now operate within the administrative framework established by the ULA/AA and contribute taxes to it.
This arrangement has provided the AA with an important advantage. By leveraging existing administrative capacity rather than building every institution from scratch, it has been able to maintain service delivery in a hybrid governance system while rapidly expanding its territorial control. This institutional adaptability may ultimately prove to be one of the most important factors behind the AA's governance project.
Funding the State Through Taxation, Customs & Lottery Systems
Every government needs revenue, and the AA's tax system has grown considerably more elaborate since its beginning. Tax collection reportedly began in 2022, primarily targeting larger businesses, has since expanded to include small shops and local enterprises, with shop owners reporting annual fees ranging from roughly 30,000 to 100,000 kyats depending on the size of the business, alongside separate levies on boats, tractors, cars, three-wheel vehicles and commercial transport.
Cross-border trade is also regulated with many goods being taxed. Alongside taxation, the AA has introduced alternative revenue mechanisms, including the “Arakkha Lottery”, with half of the revenue distributed as prize money and the other half allocated to infrastructure, education, healthcare and development projects, and it has begun providing services such as Starlink internet access through its own administrative structures. Control over trade routes has further strengthened the AA’s financial position. As Myanmar state authority has decreased, particularly along the Bangladesh border and key transport corridors, the AA has gained access to customs revenue previously collected by the central government. This has enhanced its fiscal independence and reinforced its role as a de facto governing authority.
Beyond internal revenue generation, the AA has also shown interest in external economic engagement. In a statement issued in December 2024, the Arakan People’s Revolutionary Government (APRG) invited foreign investment, promising security guarantees and cooperation for companies operating in the region. The same statement places the AA’s tax and investment framework within a broader regional strategy, involving cooperation with Beijing, and coordination with Kokang and Ta’ang groups on border stability and the suppression of online gambling networks.
A key indicator of its transition toward governance is its growing ability to generate regular revenue, which is used not only to sustain military operations but also to finance administrative functions. In addition, the AA must support large numbers of internally displaced persons resulting from prolonged conflict. These responsibilities require stable income sources that cannot be covered by wartime contributions or external aid alone.
Building a Judicial System
Judicial institutions have become a central element of the AA’s emerging governance system. In areas where Myanmar’s formal courts no longer function, the group has established its own mechanisms for dispute resolution, including courts that operate under its authority. These institutions handle a wide range of cases, from civil and criminal disputes to land conflicts and local administrative issues.
For residents, access to justice often matters more than legality or constitutional order. Courts that are accessible and efficient can generate practical legitimacy, even in the absence of formal recognition. The Taliban's shadow courts in Afghanistan ran on that principle. Their influence grew not because communities necessarily supported Taliban ideology but because many Afghans viewed the courts as faster and less corrupt than state institutions. The AA appears to be pursuing a similar logic, where legitimacy is derived less from coercion and more from the performance of basic governance functions.
The development of the AA’s judicial system began in earnest during the ceasefire period from 2021, when it introduced a formal judiciary law and established a separate Justice Department. Residents were encouraged to report crimes directly to AA authorities through email, VKontakte and Telegram while safeguarding complainants' personal information, with courts subsequently set up at the village-tract and district levels. The number of cases handled during this period indicates how quickly the system became embedded. In 2021 alone, 3,838 cases were reported to the ULA, of which 1,900 were resolved, and in just the first three months of 2022 a further 1,845 cases were received, with 1,026 resolved by April, prompting one resident of Ponnagyun township to say that AA-administered courts handled cases more promptly than the government courts they replaced.
The system has since evolved into a three-tier structure of township, district, and central courts staffed by civilian judges and judicial officers. A lawyer working within the judicial department described corruption as almost nonexistent in the AA's courts and said there is no interference from the AA in judicial decisions, with civil cases requiring a 5% fee and criminal proceedings requiring only minimal administrative costs, though complex land disputes remain a persistent source of difficulty.
At the same time, reports from February 2022, including from outlets sympathetic to the ULA, pointed to growing community dissatisfaction with the judicial sector. Subsequent investigations identified allegations of nepotism, corruption, miscarriages of justice, and land-grabbing by some AA-aligned administrators. Similar concerns were noted by the International Crisis Group in a 2022 assessment, which also found that the Rohingya population in particular remained reluctant to criticize the AA out of fear of reprisal.
Policing and Internal Security
The AA’s civilian police force, the Department of Law Enforcement and Public Security (DLEPS), plays a central role in maintaining day-to-day order. It is responsible for criminal investigations, traffic regulation, dispute resolution, and the enforcement of laws related to narcotics. Among these functions, drug control has become a major priority. Under regulations introduced by the administration, individuals involved in the production, distribution, or sale of narcotics face severe penalties, including long prison sentences and, in some cases, capital punishment. This strict approach has received support from many local residents who view drug use and trafficking as an increasing threat to social stability. However, allegations have emerged linking some officials within ULA-administered institutions to drug-related activities. In response, the administration has acknowledged these concerns and took action, including arresting DLEPS personnel accused of involvement in narcotics trafficking.
Policing under the AA has also expanded beyond conventional law enforcement into areas such as public health and environmental regulation. During the COVID-19 pandemic, DLEPS enforced stay-at-home orders through direct and sometimes coercive methods, including patrols armed with bamboo sticks and punitive sit-ups for noncompliance. Such measures were reportedly effective in achieving compliance in rural areas where state enforcement had been weak.
More recently, the administration has extended its authority into resource management and environmental protection. It has issued conservation rules limiting logging to one ton of timber per household annually before taxation applies and banning the killing or sale of protected marine species including sea turtles, dugongs, sharks, dolphins & whales.
Education as a Tool of State Formation
The AA’s approach to education provides some of the clearest evidence of its long-term political ambitions. In areas under its control, schools have gradually resumed operations, and teachers are increasingly being incorporated into administrative structures, as a part of the broader attempt to rebuild civilian life after years of conflict. Besides providing basic services, schools function as sites where ideas about identity, history, and belonging are shaped. By overseeing education, the AA is not simply reopening classrooms but is actively contributing to the construction of a distinct political community centered on Arakanese identity, which reflects a broader nation-building project. In several areas, the Rakhine national anthem authored by the AA has replaced the Myanmar national anthem in government schools across numerous townships, even as those same schools continue to be funded by Naypyidaw and staffed by SAC-salaried teachers operating under ULA/AA direction.
At the same time, the education system itself has become more formalized. In June 2026 the ULA's Department of Education introduced mandatory qualifying examinations for primary, middle and high school teachers across the areas it controls, alongside a staff audit designed to identify teachers who remain on official rosters but have stopped teaching, left the state, or taken up other work. These reforms form part of a broader institutional structure that now includes dedicated departments for basic and higher education, teacher training, examinations, and curriculum development.
Paying teachers has been one of the system's persistent weak points. During the early stages of ULA administration, many volunteer teachers received only modest, community-supported allowances because sufficient funding was not available for regular salaries, but local sources say the administration has now allocated a budget for teacher pay, however, the details of the payment system have not yet been made public. A primary school teacher in Minbya Township said that many registered educators had left the profession entirely or quietly taken other work amid the economic strain of war. Looking forward, the administration has plans to offer university-level programs in subjects including the languages of Myanmar, English, history, geography, philosophy, psychology, law, economics, international relations and political science, an ambition one youth activist described as a rare source of hope for a generation that had largely lost access to higher education amid years of conflict.
Healthcare and Social Services
Healthcare provision has become another area through which the AA seeks to build legitimacy. It remains the most strained sector of AA governance. Ongoing conflict and military blockades have disrupted supply chains, leading to shortages of medicine, equipment, and specialized personnel. Residents frequently report gaps in critical services, including obstetric and surgical care, as well as limited access to essential drugs and emergency medical devices. Despite this, the APRG has established departments responsible for public health and social welfare. The administration has launched training programs for nurses, midwives and healthcare workers and established institutions including the Arakan Medical Science School and Arakan Nursing Science School, and according to AA head Twan Mrat Naing, more than sixty doctors are currently serving in areas under AA control, even as residents report severe shortages of obstetricians, gynecologists, surgical equipment, emergency medical devices and essential medicines.
In July 2025 the Public Health Department of the Arakkha People's Government launched a Health Supervisor Grade 2 course for roughly 100 participants aged 18 to 30 who had passed Myanmar's matriculation exam, an eight-month program taught by 17 instructors covering basic anatomy, physiology and pharmacology, environmental health, basic epidemiology, public health, basic healthcare and basic obstetrics, with graduates to be assigned according to the staffing needs of the AA's Rural Health Department. In several areas, local populations increasingly rely on institutions affiliated with the AA rather than the Myanmar state. Some reports also describe mobile medical programmes operating in rural communities and contested border areas.
Moreover, the AA has run free mobile medical clinics & dengue-awareness campaigns for displaced people & local residents in Maungdaw District since late April 2026, including a session that treated more than fifty residents of Pyin Chaung village, among them pregnant women & people suffering from diarrhea & skin disease, amid a wider dengue outbreak that had produced thousands of recorded cases across Rakhine over the preceding year. However, a number of these accounts originate from sources supportive of the Arakan movement, limiting independent verification of their authenticity.
Concluding Remarks
Overall, the AA’s trajectory reflects a gradual shift from an insurgent movement to a governing authority in much of Rakhine State. Through the APRG, it has developed administrative structures that include taxation, courts, policing, education, and basic social services. These institutions suggest an effort to build a functioning governance system that extends beyond military control, even though it continues to operate in an active conflict environment.
At the same time, the durability of this model remains uncertain, as it is shaped by ongoing war conditions and questions of inclusivity and legitimacy across different communities. The AA appears to be steadily strengthening its political authority among the majority of Arakanese population through these governing structures. However, how it addresses long-standing concerns related to the Rohingya population will remain important in determining both its internal legitimacy and the level of external attention it receives in an evolving civil war.
Verification Note: The information in this report has been compiled from multiple credible sources and cross-checked for consistency. Data and reports have been used to corroborate events where possible. While every effort has been made to ensure accuracy, access limitations may prevent independent verification of all details.
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